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Abstract
We use a two-country model where policymakers minimize Barro-
Gordon-type loss functions over inﬂation, and inﬂation preferences fol-
low geometric Brownian motions, to characterize and solve the optimal
stopping problem describing a given country’s decision of whether or
not to pursue monetary integration with the other one, and derive the
conditions under which monetary integration can, or will never, be
an equilibrium outcome in our economy. We then carry out compara-
tive statics analysis on the bounds characterizing these conditions and
on the range of relative inﬂation preference parameters that support
monetary integration in equilibrium, and illustrate with numerical ex-
amples.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
When countries (or regions) evaluate the potential advantages of forming or
joining a monetary union and their preferences over inﬂation diﬀer, conven-
tional wisdom suggests that any one of them will generally beneﬁtf r o mg i v i n g
up monetary independence if the resulting union’s preferences are at least as
inﬂation averse as its own.1 This simplistic view is, however, at odds with
the growing literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty, which
has shown that the decision to invest in an irreversible project with uncer-
tain payoﬀs can be profoundly aﬀected when that investment can be delayed,
as the (real) option of waiting then typically has positive value and needs to
be accounted for.2
Several papers in the literature have started to apply this real-options
methodology to a country’s decision of whether or not to proceed with mon-
etary integration (or disintegration) when inﬂation preferences are stochastic
and such a move is interpreted as largely irreversible.3 Strobel (2000) uses
a simple two-country model where policymakers minimize a Barro-Gordon-
type loss function over inﬂation to examine the value of the option of mone-
tary integration when the national preference parameters associated with an
inﬂationary surprise follow geometric Brownian motions. Deriving analyti-
cally the critical level of the ratio of these parameters that triggers a move to
monetary integration, it ﬁnds that a country will be willing to give up mon-
etary independence only if the other country is valuing inﬂationary surprises
strictly, and potentially substantially, less than itself. The main drawbacks
of that paper are the strictly partial nature of its framework, which criti-
cally implies that monetary integration is never actually an equilibrium out-
come there, and the fact that countries’ weights in the determination of the
union-wide inﬂation preference are restricted to a symmetric scenario, which
1This abstracts from the other potential costs and beneﬁts of monetary integration; see
e.g. De Grauwe (2000), Gros/Thygesen (1998).
2See e.g. Dixit (1992), Pindyck (1991) or, more comprehensively, Dixit/Pindyck (1994).
3The growing political economy literature on the break-up of nations (see e.g.
Bolton/Roland/Spolaore (1996), Bolton/Roland (1997) or Fidrmuc (1999)) focusses on
related issues without, so far, taking the real-options nature of a secession decision into
account when its payoﬀs are uncertain and a degree of irreversibility applies.
2severely limits its practical applicability. Similar (partial) frameworks are
also used in Strobel (2001), which examines the value of the option of mon-
etary disintegration for a country in an existing monetary union when the
national inﬂation preference parameters follow a similar stochastic process,
and Strobel (2002), which extends the previous paper by deriving explicit
closed-form solutions for the expected time and probability for a country in
an existing monetary union to want to return to monetary independence.
Our present paper builds on and extends Strobel (2000) and in the pro-
cess addresses the two major shortcomings prevailing in the existing liter-
ature. Firstly, by taking equilibrium considerations into account explicitly,
w ea r ea b l et oc h a r a c t e r i z et h ec o n d i t ions determining whether monetary
integration can, or will never, be an equilibrium outcome in our economy.
Secondly, by allowing for countries’ (or regions’) weights in the determina-
tion of the union-wide inﬂation preference to be of diﬀerent magnitudes, we
are also able to, e.g., capture the relevant scenario of a single country joining
a pre-existing monetary union made up of several other countries. The paper
thus proceeds as follows: we begin by illustrating and motivating its main
ideas and intuition with an example in Section 2. Section 3 then outlines a
two-country model where national and supranational policymakers minimize
a Barro-Gordon-type loss function over inﬂation, with inﬂation preferences
modelled as following geometric Brownian motions,4 and solve for the loss
functions applying in the monetary independence and integration cases, re-
spectively, that result from policymakers’ optimal setting of inﬂa t i o ni na
discretionary policy scenario under rational expectations. In Section 4 we
characterize and solve the optimal stopping problem that describes a given
country’s decision of whether or not to pursue monetary integration with
the other one, and derive the conditions under which monetary integration
can, or will never, be an equilibrium outcome in our economy; these are
seen to be crucially inﬂuenced by the relative importance of the value of
the option of monetary integration versus the magnitude of the other (net)
4The empirical literature appears still without consensus over whether a country’s inﬂa-
tion is better described by a non-stationary or a stationary process, see e.g. Culver/Papell
(1997), Lai (1997); a geometric Brownian motion for the inﬂation process, unlike e.g. a
mean-reverting one, allows for closed-form solutions, and is thus used for analytical ease.
3beneﬁts associated with such a move. Comparative statics analysis on the
bounds characterizing these conditions, and on the range of relative inﬂation
preference parameters that support monetary integration in equilibrium, is
consequently carried out in Section 5. We ﬁnd that for both countries to
agree on forming a monetary union, and thus for monetary integration to
be an equilibrium outcome, their respective inﬂation preferences need to be
more similar the more variable and the less correlated these are, and also
the lower are the discount rate and the other (net) beneﬁts associated with
such a move. Section 6 illustrates the analytical results obtained in the two
preceding sections with some numerical examples; it also shows the range of
relative inﬂation preferences supporting monetary integration in equilibrium
to be (roughly) decreasing in the degree of similarity of the two countries’ (or
regions’) weights in the determination of the union-wide inﬂation preference.
Section 7 then sums up and concludes the paper.
2 Intuition and example
Consider the following scenario: the United Kingdom, say, is not yet a mem-
ber of the European Monetary Union, but is evaluating whether to join or
not; analogously, the current EMU countries are considering whether or not
to admit the U.K. into the union. Policymakers are concerned with inﬂa-
tion performance as a time inconsistency problem in monetary policymaking
causes an undesirable inﬂation bias to persist. If the U.K.’s inﬂation pref-
erences were lower than the EMU area’s, it would beneﬁt from giving up
monetary independence only if other (net) beneﬁts of monetary integration
compensated for the resulting worsening in inﬂation performance (a result
of some bargaining process); the EMU countries, on the other hand, would
beneﬁt unequivocally as their inﬂation performance would improve in this
case. Now, if the future evolution of these inﬂation preferences were uncer-
tain, it may be beneﬁcial to postpone forming a monetary union as both
parties will be more reluctant to commit to an irreversible move that might
later prove less advantageous than initially thought. This value of waiting,
arising from the real options nature of the decision problem involved and
4well-known from the literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty,
can be substantial; it needs to be properly accounted for as it can signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect the conditions under which, in our example, both the U.K. and
the EMU countries would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to go ahead with monetary in-
tegration. Generally, them o r eu n c e r t a i nt h o s ei n ﬂation preferences are and
the more asynchronously they evolve, i.e. the more variable and asymmet-
ric are the underlying economic and political shocks driving them, the more
similar they then need to be for the U.K. and the EMU countries to mutually
agree on forming a monetary union. The two sides’ inﬂation preferences can
b ea l l o w e dt ob em o r ed i s s i m i l a r ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h em o r em y o p i cp o l -
icymakers are, as a presently beneﬁcial move towards monetary integration
turning less advantageous in the future will matter less to them in that case,
and also the higher are the other (net) beneﬁts resulting from a move to-
wards a monetary union. As the U.K.’s contribution in the determination of
t h eu n i o n - w i d ei n ﬂation preference, as a result of the likely decision making
process, will be relatively small, it will either require the EMU countries to
have a signiﬁcantly lower inﬂation preference than its own or, as in our above
scenario, require signiﬁcant compensation in terms of the other (net) beneﬁts
of monetary integration to make up for the resulting worsening in inﬂation
performance. For a given level of those other (net) beneﬁts, the EMU coun-
tries, on the other hand, would be willing to tolerate a possibly signiﬁcantly
higher inﬂation preference on the U.K.’s part as the corresponding inﬂation
preference in the wider union will be dominated and largely determined by
t h e i ro w no n e .T h e s eq u a l i t a t i v ep r e d i c t i o n sa r em a d ea n a l y t i c a l l yc o n c r e t e
in the following sections that, in a two-country model, characterize and solve
the optimal stopping problems describing countries’ (or regions’) decisions
of whether or not to pursue monetary integration with each other when in-
ﬂation preferences are stochastic and such a move is interpreted as largely
irreversible.
53I n ﬂation preferences and loss functions
The national and supranational policymakers’ objectives, for countries (or
regions) a,b and the union u, are taken to involve the instantaneous loss rate
l(βi,πi,t)=[ πi(t)]
2 − βi(t)[πi(t) − π
e
i(t)] ,i = a,b,u (1)
where πi(t)a n dπe
i(t)r e p r e s e n ti n ﬂation and expected inﬂation, respectively.5
For the case of monetary independence the national policymakers’ inﬂa-
tion preference (or beneﬁt) parameters βj(t) ≥ 0 ,j= a,b are assumed to
follow geometric Brownian motions without drift6
dβj = σβjdzj (2)
where σ ≥ 0, 7 dzj = εj(t)
√
dt are increments of Wiener processes with
εj(t) ∼ NID(0,1) , and Et(dzadzb)=ρdt with ρ the coeﬃcient of correlation
between the processes zj (thus −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1).
For the monetary integration case the supranational policymaker’s inﬂa-
tion preference parameter is likely to be the outcome of a bargaining pro-
cess: we assume that it is determined as βu(t)=[ βa(t)]
ω [βb(t)]
1−ω ,w i t h
0 <ω<1, a weighted geometric average of the constituent national inﬂa-
tion preference parameters βj(t) evolving as above.8 The weights ω could
e.g. be thought of as reﬂecting relative size, bargaining power, or number
of seats on a decision-making committee; this model thus also captures the
scenario of a single country joining a pre-existing monetary union made up
of several other countries. Note that our particular speciﬁcation implies a
disinﬂationary bias in the supranational policymaker’s inﬂation preference,
from
Lemma 1 The instantaneous drift rate of βu(t) is strictly negative for σ>
5This adapts the discrete-time setup in Barro/Gordon (1983) to a continuous-time
environment; similar frameworks are used in Strobel (2000, 2001, 2002).
6S e ef o o t n o t e4 .
7The common instantaneous variance rate of βj(t)i sσ2; in Strobel (2000), variance
rates are country-speciﬁc.
8In Strobel (2000), these weights are restricted to be symmetric.
60,ρ<1 .
Proof. Using Ito’s Lemma, we obtain dβu =( −σ2(1 − ρ)ω(1 − ω)dt +
σ(ωdza +( 1− ω)dzb))βu ;t h u s
E[dβu]
βu = −σ2(1 − ρ)ω(1 − ω)dt < 0f o r
σ>0,ρ<1.
Restricting our analysis to a discretionary policy scenario under rational
expectations,9 the policymakers’ choice problems are to solve for the optimal
feedback rule π∗







−µ(τ−t)dτ , i = a,b,u (3)
where µ>0 is the common discount rate, treating inﬂationary expectations
πe
i(τ)a sg i v e n∀τ ≥ t . We then obtain
Lemma 2 In a rational expectations equilibrium, the loss functions associ-





2 ,j = a,b (4)
L(βu,t)=
1




respectively, for µ − σ2 > 0.
Proof. Using the relevant Bellman equation µL(βi,t)=m i n πi[l(βi,πi,t)+
1
dtEtdL(βi,t)] and applying Ito’s Lemma, we obtain π∗
i(βi)=
βi(t)
2 as the op-
timal feedback rule in question. Imposing rational expectations such that
πe
i(τ)=πi(τ) , ∀τ ≥ t at this stage and using standard properties10 of ge-
ometric Brownian motion to simplify, the loss functions (4) and (5) hold in
equilibrium, as long as µ − σ2 > 0 for convergence.
These loss functions thus give policymakers’ expected present discounted
value of losses associated with current and future inﬂation when those are
set optimally in a discretionary policy scenario under rational expectations.
9We abstract from the role of reputation in the repeated policy game and focus on a
basic scenario where an inﬂation bias does exist in equilibrium.
10See e.g. Dixit (1993, eq. (2.7)).
74 Optimal stopping problem and solution
Starting from a situation of monetary independence, the decision of, say,
country a on whether or not to pursue monetary integration with country b
involves solving the Bellman equation for the optimal stopping problem
F(La,L u)=m a x
½






where F(La,L u)i st h ev a l u et oc o u n t r ya of the option of monetary inte-
gration with country b, the proportionality factor τ ≥ 0 encompasses all
other (net) beneﬁts of monetary integration,11 and (1 + τ)La − Lu is the
expected discounted beneﬁt of entering into such an arrangement.12 Anal-
ogously, country b evaluates a similar optimal stopping problem to decide
whether or not to pursue monetary integration with country a.M o n e t a r y
integration is then an equilibrium outcome in this economy only if both coun-
tries a and b are willing to exercise their respective options together at a given
point in time, while monetary independence remains the status quo if at least
one of the countries prefers to leave the option of monetary integration un-
exercised for the time being. Note that this formulation implicitly assumes
that monetary integration is an irreversible process, so that the costs of a
later return to monetary independence are deemed prohibitively high.13 We
can then obtain















Ξb (1 + τ)
−1¢ 1
2ω
11See e.g. De Grauwe (2000), Gros/Thygesen (1998); these are ignored in Strobel (2000).
12We use Li ≡ L(βi,t) for ease of notation.
13The abandonment option of possible future monetary disintegration could be included,
albeit at considerable analytical cost.
14Note that, for τ =0∧ω = 1
2 , the trigger values Υa,Υb coincide with the special case






σ(1 − 2(ρ +( 1− ρ)ω)) − 2
p






σ(1 − 2(ρ +( 1− ρ)(1− ω))) − 2
p
(1 − ρ)(µ − ρσ2)ω
´
For σ>0 ∧ ρ<1 , it holds that Ξa > 1,Ξb > 1 ; Ξa =1 ,Ξb =1apply for
σ =0∨ ρ =1.
Proof. For country a, postponing monetary integration for a further in-
stant dt is optimal in the continuation region of the optimal stopping problem





Applying Ito’s Lemma to eq. (7) and noting that the value function F(La,L u)
should be homogeneous of degree 1,15 so that F(La,L u)=Luf(Γ)w h e r e
Γ ≡ La
Lu ,16 we obtain
4σ




2 (1 − ρ)(1− ω)ωΓ
∂f
∂Γ
− (µ − σ
2 (1 − 4(1− ρ)(1− ω)ω))f =0 ( 8 )
as the diﬀerential equation that characterizes the evolution of f(Γ)i nt h a t
region.
We solve equation (8) by standard methods, using the value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions f(Γ∗)=( 1+τ)Γ∗ − 1a n d
∂f(Γ∗)
∂Γ =( 1+τ),








from eq. (4) and (5).




(1 + τ)(β1 − 1)
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with Θ ≡ µ − σ
2 (1 − 4( 1− ρ)( 1− ω) ω)













is the trigger value
of relative inﬂation preference parameters
βa
βb separating the region in (βa,βb)
space where country a’s option of monetary integration remains unexercised
(i.e. for
βa




Analogously, repeating the above solution strategy for country b,w e













ger value of relative inﬂation preference parameters
βb
βa determining whether
country b’s option of monetary integration remains unexercised (i.e. for
βb




Monetary integration will then be an equilibrium outcome in this economy









It can ﬁnally be shown that Ξa > 1,Ξb > 1f o rσ>0 ∧ ρ<1a n dt h ea s -
sumptions on ω,τ,µ from above, while Ξa =1 ,Ξb = 1 follow by substitution
for σ =0∨ ρ =1.
Country a perceives exercise of the option of monetary integration as de-
sirable only when the current value of relative inﬂation preference parameters
17Note that zero is an absorbing barrier for the geometric Brownian motion Γ.
10βa
βb is greater than (or equal to) its trigger value Υa ; intuitively, the higher
a country’s inﬂation preference relative to the other’s, the more it stands to
gain from giving up its monetary independence. For the case where
βa
βb < Υa
, on the other hand, country a strictly prefers to leave the option of monetary
integration unexercised for the time being. Analogously, country b views ex-
ercise of the option of monetary integration as desirable only when
βb
βa ≥ Υb ,
while it strictly prefers the status quo of monetary independence for the case
where
βb
βa < Υb . Both countries a and b need to be willing to exercise their
r e s p e c t i v eo p t i o n sa tt h es a m ep o i n ti ntime for monetary integration to be
an equilibrium outcome in this economy; thus, the current value of relative
inﬂation preference parameters
βa
βb needs to be within the bounds given by
Proposition 3 for this to happen. The trigger values Υa,Υb determining these
bounds are seen to be crucially inﬂuenced by the relative importance of the
value of the option of monetary integration (as embodied in Ξa,Ξb)v e r s u s
the magnitude of the other (net) beneﬁts associated with such a move (as
represented by τ). We can state
Corollary 4 If Ξj ≤ 1+τ for j = a,b (as e.g. for σ =0or ρ =1 ), it
holds that Υj ≤ 1 ; monetary integration can be an equilibrium outcome in
this case.
Proof. The inequality for Υj follows straightforwardly given the assump-
tions on ω .
When the value of the option of monetary integration is suﬃciently small
compared to the other (net) beneﬁts of such a move, the trigger value Υj is
less than (or equal to) one; thus, a country may be willing to pursue monetary
integration even if the other country’s inﬂation preferences are higher than its
own. If (but not only if) this holds for both countries, monetary integration
c a nb ea ne q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m ei nt h i sc ase. This applies in particular for
the ”traditional” scenarios where there is no uncertainty (i.e. σ =0 )o rt h e
two countries’ inﬂation preferences are perfectly correlated (i.e. ρ =1 ) ;t h e
value of the option of monetary integration is zero in both cases (implying
Ξa =1 ,Ξb = 1), leaving the other (net) beneﬁts of such a move as the sole
determinant of the trigger values Υj . We can further state
11Corollary 5 If Ξj > 1+τ for j = a,b (as e.g. for σ>0 , ρ<1 and τ =0 ),
it holds that Υj > 1 ; monetary integration can never be an equilibrium
outcome in this case.
Proof. This follows analogously to Corollary 4.
When the other (net) beneﬁts associated with monetary integration are
suﬃciently small compared to the value of the option of monetary integration,
the trigger value Υj is greater than one; thus, a country will be willing to
pursue monetary integration only if the other country’s inﬂation preferences
are lower than its own. If (but not only if) this holds for both countries,
monetary integration can never be an equilibrium outcome in this case. This
applies e.g. for the scenario where there is some uncertainty (i.e. σ>0),
the two countries’ inﬂation preferences are less than perfectly correlated (i.e.
ρ<1) but the other (net) beneﬁts of monetary integration are zero;18 the
value of the option of monetary integration is positive in this case (implying
Ξa > 1,Ξb > 1) and constitutes the sole determinant of the trigger values Υj
.
5C o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
Turning now to a comparative statics analysis of the trigger levels Υa and
Υb, for the non-degenerate case where σ>0a n dρ<1,w eo b t a i n
Proposition 6 The directional impact of changes in σ, ρ, µ, τ and ω on
18This coincides with the framework used in Strobel (2000); thus, monetary integration
can never be an equilibrium outcome there.































for σ>0 ∧ ρ<1 .









(1−ρ)(µ−ρσ2) > 0,w i t h
Ξa > 0a n dΨ ≡− µ +σ
³
(2ρ − 1) σ +2
p
(1 − ρ)(µ − ρσ2)
´
< 0f o rσ>0
, ρ<1 and the assumptions on ω,τ,µ from above.



















Also, we can show that ∂Υa
∂τ = − Υa
2(1+τ)(1−ω) < 0.












1+τ);u s i n gl o g( x) <x −1f o rx>0∧x 6=1
,19 Φ < −τΞa
1+τ ≤ 0f o rΞa 6=1+τ ,a n dΦ = −τΞa
1+τ < 0f o rΞa =1+τ .




∂µ |ω→1−ω < 0,
∂Υb
∂σ = ∂Υa
∂σ |ω→1−ω > 0,
∂Υb
∂τ = ∂Υa




∂ρ |ω→1−ω < 0a n d
∂Υb
∂ω = −∂Υa
∂ω |ω→1−ω > 0 then hold.
We observe that Υa,Υb are increasing in the variance rate σ,ar e s u l t
that is familiar from the standard (ﬁnancial) option pricing literature; higher
uncertainty regarding country a and b’s inﬂation preferences increases the
value of the option of monetary integration and thereby raises the trigger
value that prompts that option to be exercised. The trigger values Υa,Υb
19My thanks to Ralph Bailey for pointing this out.
13are decreasing in the correlation coeﬃcient ρ, as the likelihood of the two
countries’ inﬂation preference parameters drifting apart gets smaller the more
correlated these are; this decreases the value of the option to pursue monetary
integration. Increasing the discount rate µ also leads to lower levels of Υa,Υb :
a higher discount rate (i.e. policymakers being more short-sighted) raises the
opportunity cost of leaving the option of monetary integration unexercised
for a further instant, and thus decreases the value of that option.20 The
trigger values Υa,Υb are further decreasing in the proportionality factor τ,
as exercising the option of monetary integration becomes more rewarding
the higher the other (net) beneﬁts associated with such a move. Lastly, the
higher a country’s weight in the determination of the union-wide inﬂation
preference, e.g. the higher ω for country a, the more similar are the inﬂation
performance under monetary integration and independence scenarios for that
country; this reduces the value of the option of monetary integration and thus
lowers the trigger value prompting its exercise.
Further extending our comparative statics analysis to the range of relative
inﬂation preference parameters
βa
βb that support a move towards monetary
integration in equilibrium, we can state
Corollary 7 The directional impact of changes in σ, ρ, µ and τ on the
r a n g eo fr e l a t i v ei n ﬂation preference parameters
βa
βb that support monetary





























20These results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in Strobel (2000).
14for σ>0 ∧ ρ<1 .
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from Proposition 6.
We note that higher uncertainty regarding country a and b’s inﬂation
preferences narrows the range of relative inﬂation preference parameters
βa
βb
that give rise to monetary integration in equilibrium; thus, for the two coun-
tries to agree on moving towards a monetary union, their respective inﬂation
preferences need to be more similar the more uncertainty is attached to their
future evolution. The range of country a and b’s relative inﬂation preferences
that is compatible with monetary integration being an equilibrium outcome
is, on the other hand, larger the more correlated these are; the more ”in-sync”
those inﬂation preferences evolve, the more dissimilar they can be for the two
countries to still agree on going ahead with monetary integration. The higher
t h ed i s c o u n tr a t e( i . e .t h em o r es h o r t - s i ghted policymakers), the less impor-
tant is the uncertainty surrounding the future evolution of our countries’
inﬂation preferences compared to the potential instantaneous beneﬁts from
a move towards monetary integration, and thus the less similar those inﬂa-
tion preferences need to be for that move to be mutually beneﬁcial. Also,
the larger the other (net) beneﬁts associated with monetary integration, the
less the relative importance of the (real) option value associated with such
a move, and thus the higher the degree of dissimilarity of country a and b’s
inﬂation preferences that is still compatible with monetary integration occur-
ring in equilibrium. Finally, the comparative statics eﬀects of changes in a
country’s weight in the determination of the union-wide inﬂation preference
on the relative range of (national) inﬂation preferences that are consistent
with monetary integration in equilibrium are not easily analytically tractable,
and will be discussed on the basis of some numerical examples in the next
section.
6 Numerical examples
To illustrate the analytical results obtained in Sections 4 and 5 further, we
graph the trigger values Υa (solid line) and 1
Υb (dashed line) for diﬀerent
15parameter combinations of σ, ρ, µ, τ and ω in Figures 1-4.
We observe throughout Figures 1-4 that for certain parameter combina-
tions Υa > 1
Υb applies; monetary integration can never be an equilibrium
outcome in these circumstances as countries a and b will never be willing to
exercise their respective options of monetary integration at the same time.
For other parameter combinations, however, we note that Υa ≤ 1
Υb holds;
monetary integration can generally be an equilibrium outcome in these cases
and countries will want to exercise their respective options of monetary in-
tegration concurrently if their relative inﬂation preferences fall within the
exercise range given by Proposition 3.
Figure 1 illustrates how higher uncertainty regarding country a and b’s
inﬂation preferences increases the respective trigger levels Υa,Υb and thereby
narrows the range of relative inﬂation preference parameters
βa
βb that are con-
sistent with monetary integration as an equilibrium outcome; for suﬃciently
high levels of uncertainty, monetary integration will never arise in equilib-
rium. Figure 2 demonstrates that the trigger levels Υa,Υb are decreasing
in the degree of correlation between the two countries’ inﬂation preferences,
thus leading to a widening of the range of relative inﬂation preference pa-
rameters that support a move towards monetary integration in equilibrium;
the less correlated the two countries’ inﬂation preferences, the less likely it
is that monetary integration can ever occur in equilibrium. In ﬁgure 3, the
trigger levels Υa,Υb a r es e e nt ob ea l s od e c r e a s i n gi nt h ed i s c o u n tr a t e ,a g a i n
extending the range of relative inﬂation preference parameters that prompt
monetary integration as an equilibrium outcome; the lower the discount rate,
the smaller the set of scenarios where monetary integration can ever arise in
equilibrium. Similarly, an increase in the other (net) beneﬁts associated with
monetary integration is seen to lower the trigger levels Υa,Υb in Figure 4,
thereby enlarging the range of relative inﬂation preference parameters that
give rise to such a move in equilibrium; the lower the level of these other (net)
beneﬁts, the more likely it is that monetary integration is never supported
in equilibrium.
Finally, an increase in a country’s weight in the determination of the
union-wide inﬂation preference can be seen in Figures 1-4 to reduce that
16country’s trigger level Υj , and increase the other country’s correspondingly.
The range of relative inﬂation preference parameters that support monetary
integration in equilibrium is here shown to be (roughly) decreasing in the
degree of similarity of the two countries’ weights in the determination of the
union-wide inﬂation preference.21 This last result can be explained by the
fact that the more dominant a country becomes in the determination of the
union-wide inﬂation preference, the more similar the inﬂation performance
under monetary integration and independence scenarios are for that country,
and thus the more tolerant it becomes towards potentially higher inﬂation
preferences in the other one; monetary integration is therefore more likely to
occur in equilibrium the more dissimilar are countries’ (or regions’) weights
in the determination of the union-wide inﬂation preference.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Our paper applied real-options methodology to countries’ (or regions’) de-
cisions of whether or not to form (or join) a monetary union when their
inﬂation preferences are stochastic and such a move is considered as largely
irreversible. Building on and extending previous work by Strobel (2000),
we used a two-country model where national and supranational policymak-
ers minimize Barro-Gordon-type loss functions over inﬂation, with inﬂation
preferences modelled as following geometric Brownian motions, and solved
for the respective loss functions applying in the monetary independence and
integration cases that result from policymakers’ optimal setting of inﬂation
in a discretionary policy scenario under rational expectations. We then char-
acterized and solved the optimal stopping problem that describes a given
country’s decision of whether or not to pursue monetary integration with
the other one, and derived the conditions under which monetary integration
can, or will never, be an equilibrium outcome in our economy; these were
seen to be crucially inﬂuenced by the relative importance of the value of
the (real) option of monetary integration versus the magnitude of the other
21Numerical experimentation shows that the minimum of 1
Υb −Υa generally occurs close
to, but rarely precisely for, ω = 1
2 .
17(net) beneﬁts associated with such a move. Comparative statics analysis
on the bounds characterizing these conditions, and on the range of relative
inﬂation preference parameters that support monetary integration in equi-
librium, was consequently carried out. We found that for both countries to
agree on forming a monetary union, and thus for monetary integration to
be an equilibrium outcome in our economy, their respective inﬂation prefer-
ences need to be more similar the more variable and the less correlated these
are, and also the lower are the discount rate and the other (net) beneﬁts
associated with such a move. We ﬁnally illustrated the analytical results
obtained with some numerical examples; these also showed the range of rel-
ative inﬂation preferences that support monetary integration in equilibrium
to be (roughly) decreasing in the degree of similarity of the two countries’ (or
regions’) weights in the determination of the union-wide inﬂation preference.
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